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Available online 10 November 2013As a global climate agreement has not yet been achieved, a variety of national climate policy
agendas are being pursued in different parts of the world. Regionally fragmented climate
policy regimes are prone to carbon leakage between regions, which has given rise to concerns
about the environmental effectiveness of this approach. This study investigates carbon leakage
through energy markets and the resulting macro-economic effects by exploring the sensitivity
of leakage to the size and composition of pioneering regions that adopt ambitious climate
action early on. The study uses the multi-regional energy–economy–climate model REMIND
1.5 to analyze the implications of Europe, China and the United States taking unilateral or joint
early action. We find that carbon leakage is the combined effect of fossil fuel and capital
market re-allocation. Leakage is limited to 15% of the emission reductions in the pioneering
regions, and depends on the size and composition of the pioneering coalition and the
decarbonization strategy in the energy sector. There is an incentive to delay action to avoid
near-term costs, but the immediate GDP losses after acceding to a global climate regime can be
higher in the case of delayed action compared to early action. We conclude that carbon leakage
is not a strong counter-argument against early action by pioneers to induce other regions to
adopt more stringent mitigation.
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Despite the international ambition to keep global warming
below 2 °C relative to pre-industrial mean temperature, higher
levels of warming are increasingly probable as GHG emissions
continue to rise. There is a gap between the stringency of
current GHG emission-reduction commitments and long-term
mitigation efforts that would be needed to limit warming to
2 °C, or to stabilize atmospheric GHG concentration at 450 ppm
CO2e. Due to the extremely demanding set of challenges that
it represents [1,2] a globally binding agreement to stabilize
climate change has not yet been reached. In the absence of
a global agreement, action on climate change mitigation
is emerging in a fragmented manner. A fragmented climate5 Col. Condesa, México
Currás).
r Inc. This is an open access arregime is characterized by unequal carbon prices across regions
and sectors. A fragmented climate regime, like the Copenhagen
pledges [3] can pave theway for a broader and universal regime
in the long run [4]. However, in the short- and medium-term,
carbon leakage may impact the effectiveness of overall
mitigation [5,6].
Carbon leakage is defined as the additional CO2 emissions of
non-mitigating participants (i.e. subjected to a weak reference
policy) compared to the CO2 abatement achieved by pioneering
regions (i.e. pursuing additional policy ambition). Carbon
leakage is an important aspect of fragmented regimes as it has
implications on GDP growth [7], trade [8], employment [9],
emissions [10,11] and business decisions [12].
Carbon leakage can take place through four different
mechanisms or channels that are activated by policy-induced
changes in relative prices [13]: (i) changes of international fossil
fuel trade, which has been called the energy channel;
(ii) changes of international trade in goods and services thatticle under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
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process, also known as the product market or competitiveness
channel; (iii) international trade in factors of production, i.e. the
capital market channel; and, (iv) international spillovers, i.e. the
technology and policy diffusion channel. Channels (ii & iii) are
theoretically explained by the pollution haven or factor
endowment hypotheses [14]. The energy channel [15] results
from reduced demand for fossil fuels due to unilateral action in
emission abating regions, which depresses global energy prices
and induces larger demand and consumption in non-abating
regions.
Hassler and Krusell [16] assessed qualitatively the welfare
consequences of different carbon taxes across, as well as within,
oil-consuming and -producing regions, using a dynamic
stochastic general-equilibrium model. Their results showed a
“perfect leakage” effect (i.e. all emission reductions of one
country are off-set by other countries) when carbon taxation
was imposed unilaterally, particularly due to a re-allocation
effect on oil use from oil producing to oil consuming regions, by
lowering the oil price.
Following a regionally specific approach, Böhringer et al. [8]
studied quantitatively the impact of specific climate policies by
twomajor economies, Europe and the United States, over global
distribution of economic and environmental outcomes. In their
study a generic multiregional, multi-sector CGE model of global
trade and energy was used and showed a global carbon leakage
rate1 of up to 28% and 10% when Europe and the United States,
respectively, reduced emissions due to climate policy. The study
highlights the energy channel as the main reason for carbon
leakage.
Kuik [13] estimated quantitatively carbon leakage under a
fragmented climate policy regime such as the Kyoto Protocol.
Using a CGEmodel, his assessment showed emission increase
in non-constrained regions due to increase in energy use and
decrease of energy efficiency. He estimated a rate of about
11% due to fragmented climate action.
Bosetti and de Cian [17] studied the cost–benefit consid-
erations that would lead OECD countries to undertake
increasing abatement efforts in line with the Copenhagen
pledges. In contrast to the previous studies, they used an
integrated assessmentmodelwith game theoretic structure and
detailed representation of the energy sector aswell as economic
growth. The results showed thatwhenOECD countries followed
ambitious targets, free-riding incentives and carbon leakage
induced non-members to increase emissions compared to
reference baseline. However, the carbon leakage rate decreases
with the level of ambition as more ambitious targets by the
coalition fostered innovations and technology advancements,
and induced reduction of emissions in non-signatory regions
due to technology and knowledge transfers.
Böhringer et al. [18] summarized the results of a CGE model
inter-comparison exercise aiming at investigating the economic
impacts of border carbon adjustment as a complementary
instrument to domestic climate policy. In the exercise, a
collective CO2 emission reduction target of 20% below the 2004
levelswas imposed on the abatement coalition roughly reflecting
post-Kyoto reduction commitments. Based on this, the exercise
showed statically a carbon leakage rate between 5% and 19%. The1 In this context, carbon leakage rate is deﬁned as the change in non-
abating regions' emissions over domestic emission reduction.range of leakage effects among the models used in the exercise
was traced back and attributed to assumptions about the degree
of fossil fuel supply responses andheterogeneity in traded goods,
and the regions' flexibility to substitute domestic and foreign
goods. The study showed that as model regions can more easily
substitute new sources for energy-intensive and trade-exposed
goods in response to changes induced by climate policy, the
stronger leakage it was. Additionally, the authors highlighted the
importance of the competitiveness channel rather than the
energy channel for carbon leakage.
McKibbin et al. [19] studied the role of the capital market
channel in the context of the Kyoto Protocol. Based on an
empirical relationship to represent the saving-consumption
decision of households, the study does not find a positive
contribution to carbon leakage because the implementation
of uni-lateral climate policies induces a net capital inflow for
example for the US.
The present study contributes to the scientific literature of
carbon leakage via the energy and the capitalmarket channel by
studying long-term impacts of additional policy ambition in a
fragmented global climate policy regime. Regarding the energy
channel, we (i) explore the sensitivity of leakage to the size and
composition of abatement action of mitigating regions, focusing
on Europe, China and the United States; and, (ii) assess the
dynamic leakage effects due to unilateral or joint early action,
taking into account its potential evolution in time. The present
study also contributes to the literature by analyzing carbon
leakage via the capital market channel, which is a novelty, since
capital market reallocations are induced by regional interest
rate differentials within an intertemporal framework. In this
context, we applied the multi-regional energy–economy–
climate model REMIND 1.5. REMIND is suitable for the analysis
of long-term impacts of fragmented climate policy because it
captures the interactions between economy, energy sector,
trade and climate mitigation policy.
We start the analysis with scenarios in which the world
adopts weak and fragmented policies to limit carbon emissions
and non-fossil technology targets. In this setting Europe acts as a
front runner by implementing additional policies. Looking at
early European unilateral action is interesting as, to date, it has
been a leading region in adopting climate policy [20]. For this
reason, it is possible to think that Europe is in the position to
foster the shift towards low-carbondevelopment pathways, and
at the same time motivating other regions to increase efforts
towards climate change mitigation. We investigate what is the
role for carbon leakage in such unilateral climate action.
Next, we explore the role of partial cooperation of China
or the United States in bridging the transition to a global
cooperative regime. Thus, this investigation aims to analyze how
the size of the pioneering coalition impacts on the role for carbon
leakage. Choosing China and the United States as cooperating
regions follows threemain arguments. Firstly, both countries are
top GHG emitters in the world, which makes it interesting to
assess given the potential overall environmental effects that
could arise when they pursue stringent mitigation in coalition
with Europe. Secondly, as China is a fossil resource importer and
the United States a potentially significant coal exporter, it is
relevant to analyze the impact their emissions abatement would
have on global energy trade; particularly, regarding supply
changes in fossil fuel rich regions and demand changes in
non-cooperating regions. Finally, a broadening of international
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expected. As the uncertainty of future negotiation outcomes is
significant, analyzing in depth the consequences of diverse
climate cooperation possibilities becomes relevant—particularly
under current performance of EU, China and the USA as world
leaders in the establishment of low carbon frameworks and
deployment of clean energy technologies.
We begin Section 2 by briefly describing the REMIND
model in its version 1.5. Section 3 lays out an overview of the
study design and the different scenarios analyzed. Section 4
discusses the key findings of the study including the
environmental effectiveness of unilateral and joint action,
the role for carbon leakage and the policy cost implications
of fragmented abatement action. Finally, Section 5 draws
conclusions and provides an outlook as to policy implications.2. Methods
This section provides an overview of the REMIND model
with a focus on model aspects that are of particular interest for
this study. The current version of REMIND builds on previous
model versions [21–23].2
REMIND is a global multi-regional3 model of the economy,
energy sector and the climate system that computes long-term
general equilibrium pathways until 2100. The inter-temporal
structure allows for consistent derivation of near-term and
long-term scenarios. The international trade of primary energy
carriers allows the analysis of policy-induced re-allocation
effects. The integration of both dimensions enables the detailed
analysis of climate policy proposals within a dynamic and
international context.
The REMIND model builds on a macro-economic growth
model and a detailed energy sector model. In the following we
introduce the framework and mention some details of the
energy sector, in particular the fossil fuel sector, as the
information is essential for the analysis of policy scenarios
presented in this paper.
In each region a Ramsey-type optimal growth model is
solved for the intertemporal macro-economic general equilib-
rium including perfect foresight. The markets for macro-
economic aggregates (labor, capital, goods) are in equilibrium.
The macro-economic sector – in addition to capital and
labor – demands various types of final energy (electricity,
transportation fuels, etc.) that are supplied by the energy
sector. The production of final energy requires primary energy,
conversion capacities as well as operation and maintenance.
Primary energy carriers comprise among others explicit
consideration of coal, oil and gas. Energy expenditures are
financed frommacro-economic output. Since the energy sector
model is fully embedded into the macro-economic sector via
a hard-link, all energy markets and the capital market are in
equilibrium [24].2 A more technical description can be found here: http://www.pik-
potsdam.de/research/sustainable-solutions/models/remind/description-of-
remind-v1.5.
3 It considers 11 regions: the United States; Europe (EU27); Japan; China;
India; Russia; sub-Saharan Africa (excl. Republic of South Africa); Middle
East, North Africa and central Asian countries; other Asian countries (mostly
Southeast Asia); Latin America; and, the rest of the world (incl. Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, Republic of South Africa, the rest of Europe).The various regions are inter-connected by trade flows of the
aggregate production goods, coal, oil, gas, and uraniumbetween
regions. To solve for the equilibrium of international markets
the Negishi approach is applied [25]. It assures in each period
that the international markets of traded goods are cleared and
the capital accounts are balanced over all regions. Moreover,
regions can build up capital account surpluses or deficits over
time subject to the constraint that all regional changes in capital
account have to be returned to zero by the time of the terminal
period. Thismodeling approach leads to convergence of regional
interest rates. CO2 tax revenue recycling follows a domestic
lump-sum approach.
The energy sector in each region represents capacity
stocks for the conversion of energy carriers. Investments
expand the capacity stocks, but compete with household
consumption. Once installed the capacities are subject to
technical life-time constraints that can be relaxed by early
retirement. Hence, the scale and structure of the capital stock
in the energy sector are subject to inertia, and investments
into fossil energy conversion technologies imply considerable
lock-ins. Several non-linearities are considered including
endogenous technological learning, adjustment costs for
ramping up specific capacities, and grid and storage penalties
for wind and solar electricity generation.
Fossil fuel extraction sectors utilize coal, oil and gas
endowments in each region. Endowments4 are subdivided
into different cost grades. These cost grades constitute the
long-term extraction costs that are taken from Rogner [26]
and Rogner et al. [27]. The extraction from each grade is
subject to dynamic constraints that limit the expansion and
decline of the supply from each grade. This modeling
approach leads to a price formation mechanism that
integrates the long-run cumulative extraction costs and the
short-run supply curve. Consequently, in each period and
region prices will be set by the marginal costs, which in turn
exceed average costs.
Regarding fossil fuel trade exporters carry the goods to the
border or a harbor, where the fuel enters the global market and
exporters receive the world market price. Importers pay the
costs for inter-regional transportation and carry the burden of
losses for transportation including liquefaction of natural gas.
The import distances of each region aremeasured by taking into
account the distances of exporting countries to the import
points (like main harbors) of the importing regions [28]. The
model is calibrated to replicate the production, consumption
and trade statistics. Transportation costs lead to a home bias of
consumption that results in a broad diversity of future energy
mixes in the regions depending on demand and domestic
supply.
Finally, CO2 emissions are caused by fossil fuel combustion in
energy conversion processes without carbon capture and
sequestration (CCS). For non-conventional oil the carbon
intensityworsenswith decreasing fuel quality and lower energy
return on energy invested [29,30]. Land-use change emissions
follow a baseline path and can be reduced according to a
marginal abatement cost function [31]. The same method is
applied for non-CO2 GHGs.4 Endowments comprise reserves and resources of conventional and un-
conventional coal, oil, and gas.
Table 1
Scenarios and model assumptionsa.
Scenario Front runner(s) Global
target
Action front runner(s) Action followers
Base N/A None None
RefPol N/A None Fragmented regional action (reference policy).
450 N/A 450 All adopt 450 ppm target and technology targets
RefP-EUback Europe (falls back) None Europe adopts roadmap until 2030, then falls back
to RefPol carbon pricing (emergent in RefPol) by 2050
RefPol carbon pricing (emergent in RefPol)
450P-EU Europe None Europe adopts roadmap until 2030 and then transitions to
450 ppm carbon pricing (emerging under 450 ppm target)
by 2050
RefPol carbon pricing until 2030. Transition
to 450 ppm carbon pricing by 2050.
450P-E Europe None Europe 450 ppm carbon pricing until 2100 RefPol carbon pricing until 2030. Transition
to 450 ppm carbon pricing by 2050.450P-CE Europe + China None Europe and China adopt 450 ppm carbon pricing until 2100
450P-UE Europe + the United States None Europe and the United States adopt 450 ppm carbon pricing
until 2100
a More information on the different scenarios and their implicit assumptions is available upon request from the authors.
5 The emission targets are implemented via carbon taxes. Hence, regions
that only implement weak climate policies should, in principle, be able to
increase their emissions if global fossil fuel prices fall due to more ambitious
emission reductions in other regions. This would be impossible, if the
policies were implemented via strict emission caps.
6 Refers to the Europe 2020 energy and climate roadmap [33]. For this
purpose, Europe follows ca. 25% (2020), 40% (2030) and 80% (2050) Kyoto
gas emission reduction targets relative to 1990 emissions (for simpliﬁcation,
including LULUCF; the original roadmap proposal excludes LULUCF).
Additionally, 20% renewable energy in ﬁnal energy was assumed.
7 The two scenarios differ from a full implementation of the European
roadmap by 2050, in that none of them achieve an 80% emission reduction in
2050. While in the ﬁrst variant, RefP-EUback, the road map is dropped after
2030, in the second, 450P-EU, the transition to the 450 ppm carbon pricing
leads to more than 80% reductions.
8 Differently to the “Europe succeeds” case, in this set of runs Europe
adopts an early 450 ppm carbon price trajectory rather than the roadmap.
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leakage in fragmented climate policy regimes for four reasons.
First, the model represents international coal, oil and gas
markets explicitly. Several global energy market effects can
happen, if one region reduces the demand for fossil fuels.
(i) Consumption of domestic fuels (like coal in the US) is
reduced. The domestic excess production might be delivered to
the international market, thus lowering the market price of
fossil fuels. (ii) Alternatively, no effect on international markets
is felt due to prohibitive transport costs to market the domestic
resource internationally. (iii) Emission abatement might not
only affect consumption from domestic sources, but also reduce
the demand for fossil fuel imports from the international
market, again lowering the market price for fossil fuels. This
may lead to higher imports of other regions or higher
consumption of exporters. Second, REMINDderives the demand
for fossil fuels endogenously because it models the full value
chain from fuel to energy sector to final consumers. If fossil fuel
prices decrease, the non-abating regions increase their demand
up to the point, where the marginal product equals the price.
This leads to substitution effects in the energy sector and the
macro-economic sector as well as macro-economic growth
effects that are fully captured in the model. Third, if climate
policies reduce the domestic return on capital, savings can flow
to other regions, which increases GDP abroad and generates
domestic incomes. The first two mechanisms relate to the
energy channel for carbon leakage whereas this mechanism
relates to capitalmarkets. Finally, the REMINDmodel represents
learning of renewable electricity technologieswith interregional
spillovers, which can lead to negative carbon leakage via the
technology diffusion channel if non-abating regions take
advantage from lower investment costs by also deploying such
technologies.
3. Study design
To examine carbon leakage via the energy channel under
different climate policy configurations, we perform three sets of
simulations, following the AMPERE study design on staged
accession scenarios (Kriegler et al., this volume; Table 1 [32]).
First,wemodel three reference scenarios used as benchmarks for
assessing additional mitigation policies of pioneering countries
in a fragmented policy regime: (i) a default baseline without
climate policy; (ii) a fragmented climate policy reference(RefPol), with detailed representation of regional 2020 emission
reduction targets, non-fossil technology targets and GHG
intensity improvement rates after 2020 5; and, (iii) a climate
policy benchmark with a level of stringency comparable to the
450 ppm CO2e concentration target (equivalent to a radiative
forcing of 2.6 W/m2). This was implemented in terms of a
cumulative CO2 budget of 1500 Gt CO2e for the period 2000–
2100 (following the study design) enforced on top of the
technology targets, and considering non-CO2 Kyoto gas
reduction at the carbon equivalent price induced by the budget.
The second scenario set considered European unilateral
action by adopting a carbon price trajectory consistent with the
European roadmap.6 This scenario included two variations, a
variant in which the Europe abandons the roadmap after
2030 and returns to the reference climate policy by 2050
(reconsideration case: RefP-EUback), and a variant in which all
regions (including Europe: 450P-EU) adopt the carbon price
trajectory that emerged under the 450 ppm benchmark
(Europe succeeds).7 Finally, we run three additional climate
policy scenarios where a set of front runner regions starts off on
a 450 ppm carbon pricing trajectory, and is joined by the rest of
the world after 2030.8 In these scenarios, all regions converge to
a global carbon price trajectory that emerged under the
450 ppm benchmark until 2050. We consider three different
front runner compositions — the EU27, EU27 joined by China,
and EU27 joined by the United States. In summary, a total of
eight scenarios are investigated framing the unilateral and joint
climate action exercise presented here.
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4.1. The baseline, reference policy, and immediate action
scenarios
The baseline scenario without climate policy is dominated
by fossil energy use with 2020 Gt CO2 of cumulative emissions
from fossil fuel combustion and the industry sector9 for the
period 2010–2050. In this case, demand of primary energy from
fossil fuels, increasing from 430 EJ/yr in 2010 to 935 EJ/yr in
2050, locks in the energy system into a high usage of carbon
intensive technologies. The increase in energy-related emissions
is particularly driven by the high energy intensity of economic
output, and high amount of CO2 emitted per unit of primary
energy consumption.
In the 450 ppm scenario, the cumulative CO2 emissions
for the period 2010–2050 are reduced to 1160 Gt CO2. In
contrast to the baseline scenario, the 450 ppm case is
characterized by a post-2010 decarbonization process
fostered by switching carbon-intensive energy carriers to
low-carbon or carbon free energy carriers such as
renewables, and the limited use of CCS technologies from
2030 onwards. For instance, non-biomass renewable energy
increases from 14 EJ/yr in 2010 to 100 EJ/yr in 2050, and
primary energy used in combination with CCS reaches
221 EJ/yr by 2050. Overall, comparing both scenarios,
baseline and 450 ppm, the cumulated CO2 emission gap
towards the 450 ppm target is about 860 Gt CO2 for the
2010–2050 period. The gap increases dramatically after
2050.
In terms of the reference policy scenario, emission reduction
and low carbon technology capacity targets in 2020 stimulate
global cumulated emission savings up to 11.2 Gt CO2 for the
2010–2020 period i.e. 3% compared to the baseline without
climate policy. Additionally, post-2020 emission intensity
improvement targets, foster further carbon abatement and lead
to a total cumulated emission reduction of 150 Gt CO2 for the
period 2010–2050 i.e. 8% compared to the baseline. Thus, the
reference policy leads to a reduction of the cumulative emission
gap towards the 450 ppm target by 18% to 710 Gt CO2 by 2050.4.2. Impact of European unilateral action on the energy sector
Fig. 1a shows the impact of EU adopting the 2050 roadmap
unilaterally (scenarios 450P-EU and RefP-EUback) on the level of
CO2 emissions in Europe. From 2010 to 2020, difference in
emission levels between reference policy and unilateral action
cases is minimal.10 During this period, the major driver towards
CO2 abatement is the increase in renewable energy (biomass
playing an important role) and nuclear energy in primary energy
demand. After 2020, Europe implements higher CO2 abatement
in the roadmap scenario than in the reference policy as it
approaches the 2030 emission target. By 2030, energy related
carbon intensity is reduced by partially shifting fossil primary
energy demand towards biomass (11 EJ/yr) incl. biomass CCS9 Unless stated differently, emissions will refer to CO2 emissions from
fossil fuel combustion and industry.
10 The European CO2 emission reductions from fossil fuel and industry in
2020 relative to 2005 levels in the reference policy and the road-map
scenarios are 20.3% and 21.4%, respectively.technologies (2 EJ/yr), non-biomass renewables (7 EJ/yr), and
nuclear energy (4 EJ/yr).
From 2030 onwards the European unilateral cases bifurcate
as they follow different carbon price trajectories. In the 450P-EU,
i.e. “Europe succeeds” scenario, post-2030 CO2 abatement leads
to an increasing penetration of biomass CCS technologies; by
2050, they amount to 18 EJ/yr and over 25% of total primary
energy demand. On the other hand, in the RefP-EUback, i.e. the
reconsideration scenario, a partial re-carbonization takes place
by higher consumption of fossil fuels towards mid-century
(particularly oil) and a decrease in biomass primary energy
consumption. However, pre-2030 mitigation action locks in the
high use of nuclear and biomass CCS technologies by 2050,
preventing CO2 emissions from returning to reference policy
levels even when the roadmap is abandoned.
Fig. 1b shows the impact of Europeanunilateral action on the
level of global CO2 emissions. Looking at the global picture,
emissions reduced due to European unilateral action contribute
only a very small fraction to the total abatement needed in order
to reach emission levels required in the 450 ppm scenario, at
least until 2030. Global cumulative emissions until 2030 are
reduced by 2.8 Gt CO2 compared to the reference policy case,
which closes the gap to the 450 ppm case by a mere 2.2%.
Post-2030, the “Europe succeeds” case closes the gap between
the reference policy case and the 450 ppm case mostly due to
the fact that all regions start adopting the 450 ppm carbon price
trajectory and, consequently, implementmore stringent climate
mitigation. Delayed accession of all regions to the 450 ppm
climate policy regime adds to European unilateral emission
reductions and achieves global cumulative CO2 abatement of
360 Gt CO2 compared to the reference policy during the 2010–
2050 period. In this respect, emission reduction post-2030 takes
place through energy system transformation with increasing
penetration of non-fossil low carbon technologies (140 EJ/yr
including nuclear) and CCS technologies (115 EJ/yr including
biomass CCS technologies).
4.3. Impact of early mover action on the energy sector
Here and in following sub-sections we analyze different
schemes of uni-lateral and joint action. For the purpose of
comparabilitywe assume the identical carbon tax path following
the 450 ppm scenario that is implemented in early mover
countries across the different scenario configurations. The
technology targets until 2020 are also adopted.
Fig. 2 shows the impact of the setup of the early mover
coalition on the level of global CO2 emissions. Compared to the
reference policy scenario, joint front runner action of Europe–
China, i.e. 450P-CE, leads to a global cumulated reduction of 6%
(50 Gt CO2) during the period 2010–2030. The emission gap
between the reference policy case and the 450 ppm-e case of
116 GtCO2 is closed by 39%. By contrast, a front runner coalition
of Europe and the United States, i.e. 450P-UE, leads to smaller
emission abatement compared to 450P-CE but still higher than
in the case of European unilateral action (450P-E); together,
early action by Europe and the United States leads to a
global cumulated reduction of 2% (15 Gt CO2). The gap to the
450 ppm-e case is only closed by 12% until 2030.
Fig. 3 shows the emission reductions in response to the
carbon price for the three early mover regions for the period
2020–2050. As the carbon price trajectories are the same in
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Fig. 1. CO2 emissions from Fossil Fuels and Industry: a) Europe and b) world.
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It shows that Chinese emissions respond more strongly to the
carbon tax than US emissions. Although both China and the US
are comparable in size of primary energy demand, the level of
carbon intensity per unit of energy in China (84 Mt CO2/EJ in
2010) is higher than in the United States (66 Mt CO2/EJ in
2010). Thus, China (in 450P-CE) abates more than the United
States (in 450P-UE) as it has cheaper abatement options with
respect to both energy efficiency improvements and fuel
switching in the electricity sector. China also reduces its larger
coal use in the industry and residential sectors that has a smaller
marginal product than electricity. These differences result in
emission reductions in China that are significantly larger than
those in the US.
The high carbon prices in the 450P-CE scenario push the
decarbonization of electricity and liquids production in China.
Consequently, a rapid shift from coal to lower carbon content
carriers (such as gas from5 EJ/yr in 2010 to 33 EJ/yr in 2030) and
also oil for liquids production (from 15 EJ/yr in 2010 to 34 EJ/yr2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
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Fig. 2. Global CO2 emissions from Fossil Fuels and Industry across joint
mitigation action scenarios.in 2030) is triggered. In the liquid fuel production mix, 1.2 EJ/yr
of additional oil derived liquids partially substitute 1.4 EJ/yr of
liquids from coal that emerge in 2030 for the reference policy
case. In the 450P-UE scenario, abatement in the US takes place
throughdecarbonization of electricity production by substituting
coal with nuclear. The high carbon pricing in both scenarios
pushes the deployment of non-biomass renewables. It increases
from 2 EJ/yr in 2010 to 10 EJ/yr in 2030 in China (in 450P-CE)
and from1.5 EJ/yr in 2010 to 4 EJ/yr by 2030 in theUnited States
(in 450P-UE).
After 2030, the emission gap to the 450 ppm scenario is
closed by further abatement due to the global adoption
of 450 ppm carbon pricing, achieving global cumulative
CO2 abatement of 465 Gt CO2 and 350 Gt CO2 respectively
compared to the reference policy during the period 2010–2050.
If the rest of the world did not join the global carbon pricing
regime and China and EU27 switched back to the reference
policy case, cumulative emission reduction until 2050 would
only be 148 Gt CO2. Hence, the benefit of reduced global
warming delivered by early action will only be small if the rest
of the world is not induced by the front runners to raise the
stringency of its emission reductions.4.4. Carbon leakage due to additional policy ambition in a
fragmented policy regime
Fig. 4 shows the cumulated carbon leakage resulting from
European unilateral and joint EU–China and EU–US climate
action. In the 450P-E scenario, we observe that European
unilateral emission abatement is partially offset by increasing
cumulated emissions in non-abating regions, from 135 Mt
CO2 in 2020 to 375 Mt CO2 in 2030 (Fig. 4a). From 2020 to
2030, however, the total global leakage rate11 varies between
10% and 16% as European emission reductions increase over
this period. Major regions where emissions leak are Middle
East and North Africa (5%) and the United States (3%) during
2020–2030. Additionally, we observe that in 2020, China has11 It is deﬁned as the change in cumulated CO2 emissions in non-acting
regions over emission reduction in early mover regions.
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shows a negative leakage rate.
Carbon leakage in the 450P-CE scenario increases with time,
in contrast to the 450P-E scenario. In this case, joint Europe–
China abatement is partially offset by increasing cumulated
emissions in non-abating regions from 750 Mt CO2 in 2020 to
4600 Mt CO2 in 2030 (Fig. 4b). The carbon leakage rate evolves
from 6% in 2020 to 9% in 2030. The most significant emission
increases occur in Sub-SaharanAfrica (3%) followedby Southeast
Asia (2%) as well as Latin America and the US (1%) during the
2020–2030 period. Middle East and North Africa (MEA) show
negative leakage in the 450P-CE scenario due to two effects. First,
China consumes more gas and reduces coal use; additional
international gas demand reducesdomestic consumption inMEA.
Second, as China consumes more oil for liquids production, thus
substituting for coal, additional demand for oil reduces domestic
oil consumption in MEA, as it exports more oil to China. Overall,
negative leakage in MEA is mainly driven by the first effect, i.e.
de-carbonization in the power sector by reduced consumption of
gas and increasing electricity generation from renewables.
Finally, in the 450P-UE scenario, we observe a fairly stable
leakage rate in the range of 12–13% during the period 2020–30.
During this timeframe, offset emissions of non-abating regions
increase from 430 Mt CO2 in 2020 to 1900 Mt CO2 in 2030, at
about the same rate as emission reductions in the US and Europe
increase (Fig. 4c). In this scenario, key regions with increased
emissions are China (4%), Middle East and North Africa (3%) and
Sub-Saharan Africa (1%) during the period 2020–2030.
In general, we observe that as the size of emission abatement
increases, the amount of absolute leakage also increases. Then,
total cumulated leakage is highest when Europe and China act as
a coalition and lowest when Europe acts unilaterally. Two
reasons can explain this behavior. Firstly, in the 450P-CE case,
China performs major abatement by substituting coal in
secondary electricity and liquids production with lower carbon
content energy carriers i.e. gas and oil.12 China's abatement puts12 Electricity from gas in China by 2030 is 8 EJ/yr in the reference policy
scenario, whereas it is 16 EJ/yr in the 450P-CE scenario; liquids from coal are
1.4 EJ/yr in the reference policy case, and zero in the 450P-CE case by 2030.downward pressure on global coal demand suppressing the
world market price and inducing larger consumption in the rest
of the world, particularly, in emerging economies with fast
growth of energy demand as well as very low carbon prices in
the reference policy case; e.g. Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin
America. For instance, by 2030, the coal world market price is
lower in the 450P-CE (1.9 US$2005/GJ) than in the reference
policy (2.2 US$2005/GJ). Uni-lateral action by EU does not affect
the world coal price. Secondly, as China's demand for oil and gas
rises, imports by other regions decline, e.g. Southeast Asia, which
then partially shifts to coal imports as a substitute for electricity
and liquids production; this leads to higher emissions due to
different carbon intensities of these alternative secondary energy
production technologies. The price changes of oil and gas are
only small for the scenarios with partial adoption of the 450-e
carbon tax.
In the case of the 450P-E scenario,we observe two interesting
effects: (i) the United States increases its emissions and (ii) India
reduces them. As Europe reduces demand for oil and gas, the
world market price of these energy carriers decreases. As oil and
gas get more accessible, other regions increase their imports
e.g. India which then partially substitutes coal with oil and gas
for liquids and electricity generation respectively. Then, as
India, a big coal importer, reduces demand for coal and world
prices decline, exporters have more incentive to consume the
resource domestically e.g. the United States partially shifts its
production of liquids from biomass to coal, slightly increasing
its carbon intensity in liquid fuel production. Additionally,
gas increases its share in the electricity mix at the expense of
other sources e.g. non-biomass renewables originally in place
due to implementation of renewable share targets for electricity
production.
Finally, in the 450P-UE scenario, we observe that the United
States abates emissions by reducing domestic coal consumption
and by reducing demand for oil and gas imports; domestic coal
production is partially re-allocated to exports. This phenomenon
affects world market prices due to increase in supply, making
coalmore attractive to importers such as China. Then, higher coal
consumption fosters higher level of emissions in those regions.
On the other hand, the United States decreases demand for oil
and gas, partially substituting it with higher consumption of
liquids from biomass and partially with production of electricity
from nuclear and renewables. Decreasing world demand for oil
and gas due to joint action performed by Europe and the United
States gives incentives to exporters to shift to domestic
consumption e.g. Middle East and North Africa.
Carbon leakage across scenarios takes place mostly due to
fossil fuel substitution in secondary energy conversion. Fig. 5
compares regional differences in carbon intensities in electricity
and liquids production across scenarios.13 We observe that from
all scenarios, the 450P-CE is the one that induces the most
significant shifts. We further observe that, as China reduces its
carbon intensity in electricity and liquids production (demand
for coal reduces), exporters increase domestic consumption,
moving towards a more carbon intensive generation of
electricity (e.g. the United States) and liquids (e.g. Sub-Saharan
Africa and Russia). It is worth highlighting that, as Europe is13 Bauer et al. [34] compares these ﬁndings against those produced by
other models.
2020 2025 2030
0
200
400
Emission Reduction in acting regions [MtCO2]
Emission Reduction in acting regions [MtCO2]
Emission Reduction in acting regions [MtCO2]
EU27 950 1930 3240
Cu
m
. e
m
iss
io
ns
 c
ha
ng
e 
fro
m
 2
01
0 
[M
tC
O 2
]
Cu
m
. e
m
iss
io
ns
 c
ha
ng
e 
fro
m
 2
01
0 
[M
tC
O 2
]
Cu
m
. e
m
iss
io
ns
 c
ha
ng
e 
fro
m
 2
01
0 
[M
tC
O 2
]
USA
Japan
ROW
Russia
MEA
Latin Am.
China
India
Oth. Asia
Africa
10
12
14
16
Ca
rb
on
 le
ak
ag
e 
ra
te
 [%
]
Ca
rb
on
 le
ak
ag
e 
ra
te
 [%
]
2020 2025 2030
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
EU27
China
950
11200
1940
27000
3230
50800
USA
Japan
ROW
Russia
MEA
Latin Am.
India
Oth. Asia
Africa
4
5
6
7
8
9
2020 2025 2030
0
1000
2000
3000
EU27
USA
960
3500
1920
7900
3110
13600
Japan
ROW
Russia
MEA
Latin Am.
China
India
Oth. Asia
Africa
10
11
12
13
14
Ca
rb
on
 le
ak
ag
e 
ra
te
 [%
]
a) b)
c)
Fig. 4. Cumulated carbon leakages (i.e. emissions increase in non-abating regions; in left hand scale) and carbon leakage rates (i.e. change in non-abating regions'
emissions over domestic/joint emission reduction; in right hand scale) in fossil fuels and industry across joint mitigation action scenarios: a) 450P-E, b) 450P-CE
and c) 450P-UE.
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not experience such induced inter-fuel substitution effects. In
this study, technology spillovers related to technology learning
are not observed. This is due to the fact that low carbon
technology deployment is already pushed in the reference policy
due to the technology targets. As a result the additional cost
reduction from early mover action is small and not large enough
to induce further technology diffusion to other regions.
The persistence of carbon leakage over time depends
largely on the context determined by the abatement chosen
by the front runners. If EU (and the US) acts the reduction of
oil and gas contributes a considerable part of the emission
abatement in these regions. The hydrocarbons are also subject
to relatively high fossil fuel market leakage as they find new
uses in other world regions. The initial effect is relatively large
in 2025 leading to a high carbon leakage rate, but with
additional abatement the carbon leakage saturates and
therefore the carbon leakage rate decreases. If China acts as
a pioneer, then the reduction of coal use leads to relatively
small carbon leakage in early years. Only the increasing
energy demand of Africa, which is relatively scarce in energyendowments, will absorb an increasing share of the coal that
is not consumed in China anymore and therefore the carbon
leakage rate increases over time.
In summary, emission abatement by early movers implies
leakage through the energy channel that increases with the
absolute level of abatement. The carbon leakage rates are
moderate, though, and range between 6% and 16%. Also carbon
leakage rates are not necessarily increasing over time and, some
regions can even contribute negatively to the overall carbon
leakage. Carbon leakage rates through the energy channel are
limited for three reasons. First, fossil energy demands in
non-acting regions saturate and also substitution possibilities
with non-fossil energy carriers are limited. Second, the reference
policy case includes moderate carbon pricing also in the regions
that initially do not participate in a global climate regime, which
penalizes carbon leakage to these regions. Third, fossil fuels are
internationally not fully tradable goods because of transportation
costs. Hence, effects on international markets from demand
changes in one region are dampened. In the end, both insights
suggest that even when unilateral action persists over time, the
amount of carbon that leaks to latecomer regions is limited.
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Fig. 5. Carbon intensity in secondary energy production of electricity and liquids across joint mitigation action scenarios.
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We finally analyze the macro-economic effects of additional
climate changemitigation policies.We first focus on the relative
impacts on regional GDP for the various scenarios to assess the
regional mitigation cost dynamics. Second, we look at regional
GDP changes as a driver of carbon leakage via the capitalmarket
channel.
Fig. 6 shows regional policy costs over time expressed as
GDP losses relative to the reference policy for all scenarios in
percentage terms. For the different regions and scenarios three
essential findings are derived.
First, Europe in Fig. 6(a) incurs a higherGDP loss,when acting
alone than in the case of globally coordinated action.14 Acting in
alliance with the US or China instead of acting unilaterally leads
only to a negligible reduction of GDP losses. Similarly, the GDP of
China and the US is less affected by the carbon tax when
implemented globally thanwhen these countries act as pioneers.
Hence, in case Europe, China and the US decided to implement a
carbon tax, their GDP would be less affected, if other regions
applied the tax as well.14 The signiﬁcant dip of the time paths around 2035/40 is due to the
speciﬁc policy proposals combining emission limitations and technology
policies. For instance, in Fig. 1(a) it can be seen that the emissions stabilize in
the 450-e scenarios after 2020 and are forced to decrease again after 2030.Second, the levels of GDP losses are very different across
regions. Europe would only experience a small additional GDP
loss; until 2030 the additional net present valueGDP loss is 0.2%.
The additional losses for the US, and particularly China, are
higher. The early application of the carbon tax reduces the net
present value of GDP until 2030 by 0.5% in the USA and by 2% in
China compared to the reference policy case. The remarkable
difference between China and theUS highlights on the one hand
the importance of energy supply to support the economic
development process. In addition, China will undertake larger
emission reductions than the US due to the larger availability of
cheap abatement options (Fig. 3).
Third, the ramp-up of GDP losses for China approximately
has similar magnitude for an immediate adoption of 450 ppm
carbon pricing or for convergence to 450 ppm levels between
2035 and 2050. This is different in the US and other regions,
where the ramp-up of GDP losses is faster in the delayed tax
case; Fig. 6(c–d). In all three – China, the US and other regions –
the delayed tax leads to somewhat higher annual GDP losses in
2050, although the taxes converge to the same level in that year.
The relative GDP loss for the US over the 20 year period after
raising the carbon tax is higher when the tax ramps up after
2030 (period 2030–50; 0.6% GDP loss), than when jumping to
the 450 ppm level immediately (period 2010–2030; 0.5% GDP
loss). In China, instead, the corresponding loss is 0.2%-points
smaller, which indicates that the carbon tax exerts a stronger
economic impact in earlier stages of economic development.
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Table 2
Redistribution of GDP from early mover action. Numbers measure the
change of cumulative net present value of GDP 2010–30 in bn.US$ (2005).
The discount rate is 5%/yr. Other regions comprise those regions that are not
part of the early mover coalition in the specific scenario. The bottom row
reports the ratio of GDP increases in late-coming regions divided by the GDP
reduction in the front-runner countries.
450P-E 450P-CE 450P-UE
GDP reduction of
early movers
EU 440 380 420
China – 2200 –
USA – – 900
GDP increase
of late-comers
Other regions 120 360 320
Ratio 28% 14% 24%
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capital markets as a driver of carbon leakage. Table 2 shows
the GDP changes for pioneering and late-coming regions as
well as the ratio between both (bottom row). The changes
are due to re-allocation of investment flows on the
international capital market and the re-allocation of fossil
fuels across regions. The figures show that the ratio of GDP
redistribution exceeds the carbon leakage rate. This means
that international capital markets react relatively flexible.
However, it does not imply that the capital market is the
major driver behind carbon leakage. For instance, in the
scenario with China and EU acting together the cumulative
carbon emission in 2010–30 increases by 1% in late-coming
regions compared with the reference policy case. The
corresponding increase in cumulative GDP is less than 1‰,
and therefore international re-allocation of economic activity
is not a major driver of carbon leakage as stated in [6]. In
summary, as mitigation efforts rise along the 450 ppm
carbon price trajectory, macroeconomic output is suppressed
across scenarios. This is mainly because (i) less primary
energy originating from a reduction of fossil energy supply
generates less GDP and (ii) the energy sector relies on higher
cost technologies and attracts more financial resources that
crowd out other investments. Though capital markets are
highly flexible the reallocation of global investments is not a
significant driver for carbon leakage.
5. Conclusions
Given the challenges to international cooperation on
mitigating climate change, a number of climate policies have
been implemented by various countries and regions, while
others remain on the sideline. The heterogeneity of climate
policy approaches has given rise to an internationally
fragmented climate policy regime. Subsequently, global
emission externalities such as carbon leakage have emerged
as an important topic within the climate change mitigation
debate.
This study illustrates the incidence and consequences of
carbon leakage as an effect of early action in a fragmentedclimate policy regime. For this analysis, the REMIND
integrated assessment model of the global economy, energy
sector and the climate system is used to evaluate the
environmental effectiveness and economic implications of
unilateral and joint mitigation efforts. Overall, the main scope
of this paper is to examine the role of carbon leakage via the
energy channel, i.e. the increase in fossil fuel use in regions
with weaker or non-existent climate policies due to more
stringent mitigation action in other regions. The study also
includes the capital market channel of carbon leakage.
We derive four main findings from our study. First, a
reference policy scenario extrapolating fragmented action at
current levels of ambition into the future will reduce emissions
only modestly compared to the idealized case of immediate
cooperative action on reaching a 450 ppm CO2e stabilization
target (compare Blanford et al. [35]). Therefore, a pioneering
region adopting more stringent emission reductions may be
needed to strengthen climate mitigation. We show that the
main impact on additional emission reductions does not come
from the earlymover action itself, but from the rest of theworld
following up with strengthening their abatement effort post
2030. Thus, a pioneer in adopting more stringent mitigation
action needs to be particularly concerned with its ability to
induce others to follow.
Second, the carbon leakage rate via the energy channel is
limited to below 16% of the additional emission reductions from
more stringent abatement action by pioneering regions. This
result holds for different sizes and compositions of the early
mover coalition. The carbon leakage mechanisms include the
reduction of coal use in pioneering regions, or indirectly in other
regions via knock-on substitution effects from reduced gas use in
abating regions, leading to increased coal consumption in the
rest of the world. While the type of mechanism and the regions
that increase their fossil fuel consumption vary with the early
mover coalition, the general result of limited leakage stands. This
implies that carbon leakage, at least via the energy channel
investigated here, is not strongly impacting the emission
reduction gains from early mover action, and does not
permanently increase the lock-in into fossil fuel infrastructure
in other regions. It therefore does not provide a strong
counter-argument against adoption ofmore stringentmitigation
efforts by pioneering regions.
Compared with the scientific literature that mainly focused
on the competitiveness channel the upper limit of 16% carbon
leakage rate due to the energymarket channel is small (Babiker
202 T. Arroyo-Currás et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 90 (2015) 192–203[36]; Babiker [37]; Bernstein et al. [38]; Bollen et al. [39];
Burniaux and Oliveira-Martins [40]; Burniaux and Truong [41];
Gerlagh and Kuik [42]; Kuik and Gerlagh [43]; Light et al. [44];
Manne and Richels [45]; McKibbin et al. [19]). In the REMIND
model the representation of international fossil fuel markets is
highly flexible and fossil based energy conversion technologies
can easily replace alternatives. Hence, fossil fuel suppliers can, in
principle, find new demands easily, if demand is reduced due to
uni-lateral climate policies. Carbon leakage via the energy
market channel is mainly limited due to trade costs of fossil
fuels and demand for final energies in non-abating countries. In
the present study also the carbon prices of themoderate climate
policies dampen the carbon leakage. Studies focusing on the
competitiveness channel usually depend on the choice of trade
elasticities with higher elasticities implying larger carbon
leakage rates. In this study fossil energy trade is not limited in
a similar way, and therefore limitations should imply even
smaller carbon leakage rates.
Third, we observe that the re-allocation of emissions due
to carbon leakage depends mostly on the energy system
structure of the region that takes abatement action i.e.
whether the region is a fossil resource importer (e.g. Europe),
exporter (e.g. the United States) or de facto carbon intensive
economy (e.g. China). We conclude that carbon leakage is a
dynamic effect that mostly depends on (i) demand response
of fuel importers to price changes, (ii) inter-fuel substitution
possibilities and (iii) transportation cost barriers in the fossil
fuel market.
Regarding the economic implications of fragmented
climate action we confirm the assertion that early mitigation
action leads to short-run GDP losses for the first movers, but
delayed implementation of the carbon tax can lead to larger
losses after the introduction of the tax. The larger tax shock
can act as a significant barrier to take more stringent action
and therefore delaying action might further impede the
adoption of more ambitious carbon tax levels in the long run.
We also find reallocation of GDP between early mover and
late-comer regions triggered by the international capital
market, but this is not a major driver of carbon leakage. This
result is, however, different to the result of McKibbin et al.
[19] who identified the converse effect on carbon leakage for
the US.
Several caveats apply to the analysis here. First, the REMIND
version used for this study does not take into account bilateral
fossil fuel trade, but assumes a global pool trading scheme.
Considering bilateral (or multilateral) trading reduces the
flexibility of fossil fuel owners to redirect their supplies as
some regions reduce their demand. Hence, this improvement
might lead to lower leakage rates. Second, the study focused
only on the energy channel of carbon leakage, although
macro-economic substitution effects between energy, capital
and labor were accounted for. Expanding the analysis of
dynamic leakage in staged accession scenarios to a larger set of
leakage channels, particularly including the re-allocation of
energy intensive industries, would help to better constrain the
full carbon leakage effect. It is worth mentioning that
technology spillovers related to technology learning are not
observed in this study.
We conclude from the results that the value of individual
regions or coalitions adopting more stringent climate action
rises or falls with their ability to induce others to follow suit.Thus, while global cooperation on climate mitigation may
prove illusory in the short run, credible and strong mitigation
action by major countries can help to keep the door open for
future global action to stabilize climate change as carbon
leakage effects are limited.
The research leading to these results has received
funding from the European Union Seventh Framework
Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement n°
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